We propose a new and simple adaptive procedure for playing a game: ''regret-matching.'' In this procedure, players may depart from their current play with probabilities that are proportional to measures of regret for not having used other strategies in the past. It is shown that our adaptive procedure guarantees that, with probability one, the empirical distributions of play converge to the set of correlated equilibria of the game.
INTRODUCTION THE LEADING NONCOOPERATIVE EQUILIBRIUM NOTIONS for N-person games in
Ž . Ž . strategic normal form are Nash equilibrium and its refinements and correlated equilibrium. In this paper we focus on the concept of correlated equilibrium. Ž . A correlated equilibriumᎏa notion introduced by Aumann 1974 ᎏcan be described as follows: Assume that, before the game is played, each player Ž . receives a private signal which does not affect the payoffs . The player may then choose his action in the game depending on this signal. A correlated equilibrium of the original game is just a Nash equilibrium of the game with the signals. Considering all possible signal structures generates all correlated equilibria. If Ž . the signals are stochastically independent across the players, it is a Nash Ž . equilibrium in mixed or pure strategies of the original game. But the signals could well be correlated, in which case new equilibria may obtain.
Equivalently, a correlated equilibrium is a probability distribution on N-tuples of actions, which can be interpreted as the distribution of play instructions given to the players by some ''device'' or ''referee.'' Each player is givenᎏprivatelyᎏ instructions for his own play only; the joint distribution is known to all of them. Also, for every possible instruction that a player receives, the player realizes that the instruction provides a best response to the random estimated play of the other playersᎏassuming they all follow their instructions.
Ž . There is much to be said for correlated equilibrium. See Aumann 1974 Aumann , 1987 for an analysis and foundational arguments in terms of rationality. Also, from a 1 Ž . October 1998 minor corrections: June 1999 . Previous versions: February 1998; November 1997; Ž . December 1996; March 1996 handout . Research partially supported by grants of the U.S.-Israel Binational Science Foundation, the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, the Spanish Ministry of Education, and the Generalitat de Catalunya. 2 We want to acknowledge the useful comments and suggestions of Robert Aumann, Antonio
Cabrales, Dean Foster, David Levine, Alvin Roth, Reinhard Selten, Sylvain Sorin, an editor, the anonymous referees, and the participants at various seminars where this work was presented.
practical point of view, it could be argued that correlated equilibrium may be the most relevant noncooperative solution concept. Indeed, with the possible exception of well-controlled environments, it is hard to exclude a priori the possibility that correlating signals are amply available to the players, and thus find their way into the equilibrium. This paper is concerned with dynamic considerations. We pose the following question: Are there simple adapti¨e procedures always leading to correlated equilibrium? Ž . Foster and Vohra 1997 have obtained a procedure converging to the set of Ž . correlated equilibria. The work of Fudenberg and Levine 1999 led to a second one. We introduce here a procedure that we view as particularly simple and Ž . intuitive see Section 4 for a comparative discussion of all these procedures . It does not entail any sophisticated updating, prediction, or fully rational behavior. Our procedure takes place in discrete time and it specifies that players adjust strategies probabilistically. This adjustment is guided by ''regret measures'' based on observation of past periods. Players know the past history of play of all Ž players, as well as their own payoff matrix but not necessarily the payoff . matrices of the other players . Our Main Theorem is: The adaptive procedure generates trajectories of play that almost surely converge to the set of correlated equilibria.
The procedure is as follows: At each period, a player may either continue playing the same strategy as in the previous period, or switch to other strategies, with probabilities that are proportional to how much higher his accumulated payoff would have been had he always made that change in the past. More precisely, let U be his total payoff up to now; for each strategy k different from Ž . his last period strategy j, let V k be the total payoff he would have received if Ž he had played k every time in the past that he chose j and everything else . Ž . remained unchanged . Then only those strategies k with V k larger than U may be switched to, with probabilities that are proportional to the differences Ž . V k y U, which we call the ''regret'' for having played j rather than k. These probabilities are normalized by a fixed factor, so that they add up to strictly less than 1; with the remaining probability, the same strategy j is chosen as in the last period.
It is worthwhile to point out three properties of our procedure. First, its simplicity; indeed, it is very easy to explain and to implement. It is not more Ž Ž . Ž . involved than fictitious play Brown 1951 and Robinson 1951 ; note that in the . two-person zero-sum case, our procedure also yields the minimax value . Sec-Ž ond, the procedure is not of the ''best-reply'' variety such as fictitious play, Ž Ž . . smooth fictitious play Fudenberg and Levine 1995, 1999 or calibrated learn-Ž Ž . . . ing Foster and Vohra 1997 ; see Section 4 for further details . Players do not choose only their ''best'' actions, nor do they give probability close to 1 to these choices. Instead, all ''better'' actions may be chosen, with probabilities that are proportional to the apparent gains, as measured by the regrets; the procedure could thus be called ''regret-matching.'' And third, there is ''inertia.'' The strategy played in the last period matters: There is always a positive probability of continuing to play this strategy and, moreover, changes from it occur only if there is reason to do so.
At this point a question may arise: Can one actually guarantee that the smaller set of Nash equilibria is always reached? The answer is definitely ''no.'' On the one hand, in our procedure, as in most others, there is a natural coordination device: the common history, observed by all players. It is thus reasonable to expect that, at the end, independence among the players will not obtain. On the other hand, the set of Nash equilibria is a mathematically Ž complex set a set of fixed-points; by comparison, the set of correlated equilibria . is a convex polytope , and simple adaptive procedures cannot be expected to guarantee the global convergence to such a set.
After this introductory section, in Section 2 we present the model, describe Ž . the adaptive procedure, and state our result the Main Theorem . Section 3 is devoted to a ''stylized variation'' of the procedure of Section 2. It is a variation Ž . that lends itself to a very direct proof, based on Blackwell's 1956a Approachability Theorem. This is a new instrument in this field, which may well turn out to be widely applicable.
Section 4 contains a discussion of the literature, together with a number of relevant issues. The proof of the Main Theorem is relegated to the Appendix.
THE MODEL AND MAIN RESULT
N is the set of players, S i is the set of strategies of player i, and DEFINITION: A probability distribution on S is a correlated equilibrium of ⌫ if, for every i g N, every j g S i and every k g S i we have
If in the above inequality we replace the right-hand side by an ) 0, then we obtain the concept of a correlated -equilibrium.
Note that every Nash equilibrium is a correlated equilibrium. Indeed, Nash equilibria correspond to the special case where is a product measure, that is, the play of the different players is independent. Also, the set of correlated Ž equilibria is nonempty, closed and convex, and even in simple games e.g., . ''chicken'' it may include distributions that are not in the convex hull of the Nash equilibrium distributions. For every two different strategies j, k g S i of player i, suppose i were to replace strategy j, every time that it was played in the past, by strategy k; his payoff at time , for F t, would become
The resulting difference in i's average payoff up to time t is then
The expression R j, k has a clear interpretation as a measure of the average t ''regret'' at period t for not having played, every time that j was played in the past, the different strategy k.
Fix ) 0 to be a large enough number. 5 Let j g S i be the strategy last i i Ž i . chosen by player i, i.e., j s s . Then the probability distribution p g ⌬ S t t q1
used by i at time t q 1 is defined as
Note that the choice of guarantees that p j ) 0; that is, there is always a tq1 positive probability of playing the same strategy as in the previous period. The
play p g ⌬ S at the initial period is chosen arbitrarily. Ž . We write ⌬ Q for the set of probability distributions over a finite set Q.
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Ž . The parameter is fixed throughout the procedure independent of time and history . It suffices Ž . Informally, 2.2 may be described as follows. Player i starts from a ''reference point'': his current actual play. His choice next period is governed by propensities to depart from it. It is natural therefore to postulate that, if a change occurs, it should be to actions that are perceived as being better, relative to the current choice. In addition, and in the spirit of adaptive behavior, we assume that all such better choices get positive probabilities; also, the better an alternative action seems, the higher the probability of choosing it next time. Further, there Ž is also inertia: the probability of staying put and playing the same action as in . the last period is always positive.
More precisely, the probabilities of switching to different strategies are proportional to their regrets relative to the current strategy. The factor of proportionality is constant. In particular, if the regrets are small, then the probability of switching from current play is also small.
Ž . For every t, let z g ⌬ S be the empirical distribution of the N-tuples of t strategies played up to time t. That is, for every 7 s g S, such that for all t ) T we can find a correlated equilibrium distribution at a 0 t Ž distance less than from z . Note that this T depends on the history; it is an t 0 . ''a.s. finite stopping time.'' That is, the Main Theorem says that, with probability Ž . Ž . one, for any ) 0, the random trajectory z , z , . . . , z , . . . enters and then 1 2 t Ž . stays forever in the -neighborhood in ⌬ S of the set of correlated equilibria. Ž Put differently: Given any ) 0, there exists a constant i.e., independent of . Ž . history t s t such that, with probability at least 1 y , the empirical 0 0 distributions z for all t ) t are in the -neighborhood of the set of correlated t 0 equilibria. Finally, let us note that because the set of correlated equilibria is Ž . nonempty and compact, the statement ''the trajectory z converges to the set t Ž . of correlated equilibria'' is equivalent to the statement ''the trajectory z is t Ž . such that for any ) 0 there is T s T with the property that z is a 1 1 t correlated -equilibrium for all t ) T .'' 1 Ž . We conclude this section with a few comments see also Section 4 : Ž .
Ž . 1 Our adaptive procedure 2.2 requires player i to know his own payoff Ž . matrix but not those of the other players and, at time t q 1, the history h ; 
period .
Ž .
2 At every period the adaptive procedure that we propose randomizes only over the strategies that exhibit positive regret relative to the most recently played strategy. Some strategies may, therefore, receive zero probability. Suppose that we were to allow for trembles. Specifically, suppose that at every Ž period we put a ␦ ) 0 probability on the uniform tremble each strategy thus i . being played with probability at least ␦rm . It can be shown that in this case Ž the empirical distributions z converge to the set of correlated -equilibria of t . course, depends on ␦ , and it goes to zero as ␦ goes to zero . In conclusion, Ž unlike most adaptive procedures, ours does not rely on trembles which are . usually needed, technically, to get the ''ergodicity'' properties ; moreover, our result is robust with respect to trembles.
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3 Our adaptive procedure depends only on one parameter, . This may be Ž Ž. Ž. . viewed as an ''inertia'' parameter see Subsections 4 g and 4 h : A higher yields lower probabilities of switching. The convergence to the set of correlated Ž . equilibria is always guaranteed for any large enough ; see footnote 5 , but the speed of convergence changes with .
Ž . 4 We know little about additional convergence properties for z . It is easy to t see that the empirical distributions z either converge to a Nash equilibrium in t pure strategies, or must be infinitely often outside the set of correlated equilib-Ž 9 ria because, if z is a correlated equilibrium from some time on, then all t . regrets are 0, and the play does not change . This implies, in particular, that Ž Ž . . interior relative to ⌬ S points of the set of correlated equilibria that are not Ž pure Nash equilibria are unreachable as the limit of some z but it is possible t . that they are reachable as limits of a subsequence of z . . In this section which can be viewed as a motivational preliminary we shall replace the adaptive procedure of Section 2 by another procedure that, while related to it, is more stylized. Then we shall analyze it by means of Blackwell's Ž . 1956a Approachability Theorem, and prove that it yields convergence to the 8 Ž . Using a parameter rather than a fixed normalization of the payoffs was suggested to us by Reinhard Selten.
9 See the Proposition in Section 3. set of correlated equilibria. In fact, the Main Theorem stated in Section 2, and its proof in Appendix 1, were inspired by consideration and careful study of the result of this section. Furthermore, the procedure here is interesting in its own Ž right see, for instance, the Remark following the statement of Theorem A, and Ž .
. d in Section 4 .
Fix a player i and recall the procedure of Section 2: At time t q 1 the transition probabilities, from the strategy played by player i in period t to the strategies to be played at t q 1, are determined by the stochastic matrix defined Ž .
by the system 2.2 . Consider now an invariant probability vector q s q j
g ⌬ S for this matrix such a vector always exists . That is, q satisfies
By collecting terms, multiplying by , and formally letting i Ž . R j, j [ 0, the above expression can be rewritten as
In this section we shall assume that play at time t q 1 by player i is i Ž .
i Ž . i Ž . determined by a solution q to the system of equations 3.1 ; i.e., p j [ q j .
In a sense, we assume that player i at time t q 1 goes instantly to the invariant Ž . distribution of the stochastic transition matrix determined by 2.2 . We now state the key result. 
On any subsequence where z converges, say z ª g ⌬ S , we get
The result is immediate from the definition of a correlated -equilibrium and Ž . 2.1c .
Q. E. D.
Theorem A and the Proposition immediately imply the following corollary. Before addressing the formal proof of Theorem A, we shall present and discuss Blackwell's Approachability Theorem.
i
The basic setup contemplates a decision-maker i with a finite action set S .
vector payoff¨s , s g ‫ޒ‬ that depends on his action s g S and on some yi Ž . yi Ž external action s belonging to a finite set S we will refer to yi as the . 
Ý¨s , s , approaches a predetermined set in ‫ޒ‬ . 
Ž .
Ä let w denote the support function of the convex set C C, i.e., w [ sup и c :
Ž . c g C C for all in ‫ޒ‬ . Given a point xg ‫ޒ‬ which is not in C C, let F x be Ž . the unique point in C C that is closest to x in the Euclidean distance, and Ž . Ž . Ž . put x [ xy F x ; note that x is an outward normal to the set C C at the Ž . point F x . 
BLACKWELL'S APPROACHABILITY THEOREM: Let
We will refer to the condition for approachability given in the Theorem as the Blackwell condition, and to the procedure there as the Blackwell procedure. To Ž . get some intuition for the result, assume that D is not in C C, and let H H D be We now prove Theorem A.
PROOF OF THEOREM A: As mentioned, the proof of this Theorem consists of an application of Blackwell's Approachability Theorem. Let
. and define the vector payoff¨s , s g ‫ޒ‬ by letting its j, k g L coordinate be
L all g ‫ޒ‬ and w s ϱ otherwise; so only g ‫ޒ‬ need to be considered. such that xy F x и¨q x , s y F x F 0, for all s g S . It is easy to verify that this is equivalent to our formulation. We further note a simple way of stating the Blackwell result: A convex set C C is approachable if and only if any half-space containing C C is approachable.
yi yi
Ž . for all s g S . After collecting terms, the left-hand side of 3.3 can be written as
Let q g ⌬ S be an invariant vector for the nonnegative S = S matrix with Ž . Ž . entries j, k for j / k and 0 for j s k such a q always exists . That is, q
Ž . for every j g S . Therefore ␣ j s 0 for all j g S , and so inequality 3.3 holds Ž 17 .
yi yi true as an equality for all s g S . The Blackwell condition is thus satisfied by the set C Cs ‫ޒ‬ L .
y Ž . Consider D , the average payoff vector at time t. Its j, k -coordinate is
, which is the vector of regrets at time t. Now the given strategy 
Q. E. D.
REMARK: The proof of Blackwell's Approachability Theorem also provides bounds on the speed of convergence. In our case, one gets the following: The i ' w Ž .x expectation E R j, k of the regrets is of the order of 1r t , and the probabilt yc T Ž ity that z is a correlated -equilibrium for all t ) T is at least 1 y ce for an t Ž appropriate constant c ) 0 depending on ; see Foster and Vohra 1999, ..
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Section 4.1 . Clearly, a better speed of convergence for the expected regrets cannot be guaranteed, since, for instance, if the other players play stationary ' mixed strategies, then the errors are of the order 1r t by the Central Limit Theorem.
DISCUSSION
This section discusses a number of important issues, including links and comparisons to the relevant literature.
Ž . a Foster and Vohra. The seminal paper in this field of research is Foster and Ž . Vohra 1997 . They consider, first, ''forecasting rules''ᎏon the play of othersᎏthat enjoy good properties, namely, ''calibration.'' Second, they assume that each player best-replies to such calibrated forecasts. The resulting procedure leads to correlated equilibria. The motivation and the formulation are quite different from ours; nonetheless, their results are close to our results Ž . specifically, to our Theorem A , since their calibrated forecasts are also based on regret measures.
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Ž . b Fudenberg and Le¨ine. The next important paper is Fudenberg and Levine
. 1999 see also their book 1998 . In that paper they offer a class of adaptive procedures, called ''calibrated smooth fictitious play,'' with the property that for every ) 0 there are procedures in the class that guarantee almost sure Ž convergence to the set of correlated -equilibria but the conclusion does not . hold for s 0 . The formal structure of these procedures is also similar to that of our Theorem A, in the sense that the mixed choice of a given player at time t is determined as an invariant probability vector of a transition matrix. However, Ž . the transition matrix and therefore the stochastic dynamics is different from the regret-based transition matrix of our Theorem A. To understand further the similarities and differences between the Fudenberg and Levine procedures and Ž . Ž . our own, the next two Subsections, c and d , contain a detour on the concepts of ''universal consistency '' and ''universal calibration.'' 18 Up to a constant factor.
19
Ž yi . These regrets are defined on an -grid on ⌬ S , with going to zero as t goes to infinity. Therefore, at each step in their procedure one needs to compute the invariant vector for a matrix of an increasingly large size; by comparison, in our Theorem A the size of the matrix is fixed, In other words, i's average payoff is, in the limit, no worse than if he were to play any constant strategy k g S i for all F t. This property of the Hannan procedure for player i is called uni¨ersal consistency by Fudenberg and Levine Ž . Ž . 1995 it is ''universal'' since it holds no matter how the other players play .
Ž . Another universally consistent procedure was shown by Blackwell 1956b to Ž Ž result from his Approachability Theorem see also Luce and Raiffa 1957, pp. ..
482᎐483 .
The adaptive procedure of our Theorem A is also universally consistent. i Ž . Indeed, for each j in S , 4.1 is guaranteed even when restricted to those periods when player i chose that particular j; this being true for all j in S i , the result follows. However, the application of Blackwell's Approachability Theorem in Section 3 suggests the following particularly simple procedure.
At time t, for each strategy k in S i , let . i Ž i . players distributed as in the empirical distribution up to t and ¨ , where ) 0 and¨i is a strictly concave smooth function defined on i's strategy Ž i . Ž i . simplex, ⌬ S , with infinite length gradient at the boundary of ⌬ S . The result of Fudenberg and Levine is then that, given any ) 0, there is a sufficiently small such that universal -consistency obtains for player i. Observe that, for Ž small , smooth fictitious play is very close to fictitious play it amounts to playing the best response with high probability and the remaining strategies with . low but positive probability . The procedure is, therefore, clearly distinct from Ž .
Ž . 4.2 : In 4.2 all the better, even if not best, replies are played with significant Ž . probability; also, in 4.2 the inferior replies get zero probability. Finally, it is worth emphasizing that the tremble from best response is required for the Fudenberg and Levine result, since fictitious play is not guaranteed to be Ž . consistent. In contrast, the procedure of 4.2 has no trembles.
Ž . The reader is referred to Hart and Mas-Colell 1999 , where a wide class of Ž universally consistent procedures is exhibited and characterized including as Ž . . special cases 4.2 as well as smooth fictitious play .
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d Uni¨ersal Calibration. The idea of ''universal calibration,'' also introduced Ž . by Fudenberg and Levine 1998, 1999 , is that, again, regret measures go to zero irrespective of the other players' play. The difference is that, now, the set of regret measures is richer: It consists of regrets that are conditional on the strategy currently played by i himself. Recall the Proposition of Section 3: If such universally calibrated strategies are played by all players, then all regrets become nonpositive in the limit, and thus the convergence to the correlated equilibrium set is guaranteed.
Ž . The procedure of Theorem A is universally calibrated; so up to is the Ž . ''calibrated smooth fictitious play'' of Fudenberg and Levine 1999 . The two procedures stand to each other as, in the unconditional version, Theorem B stands to ''smooth fictitious play.'' Ž . The procedure 2.2 of our Main Theorem is not universally calibrated. If only player i follows the procedure, we cannot conclude that all his regrets go to zero; adversaries who know the procedure used by player i could keep his regrets positive. 22 Such sophisticated strategies of the other players, however, are outside the framework of our studyᎏwhich deals with simple adaptive behavior. In fact, it turns out that the procedure of our Main Theorem is guaranteed to be calibrated not just against opponents using the same procedure, but also against a wide class of behaviors.
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Ž .
We regard the simplicity of 2.2 as a salient point. Of course, if one needs to guarantee calibration even against sophisticated adversaries, one may have to give up on simplicity and resort to the procedure of Theorem A instead. 21 They actually call it ''calibration''; we prefer the term ''universal calibration,'' since it refers to Ž w x . any behavior of the opponents as in their '' conditional universal consistency'' . 
e Better-reply¨s. Best-reply. Note that all the procedures in the literature Ž . reviewed above are best-reply-based: A player uses almost exclusively actions Ž . that are almost best-replies to a certain belief about his opponents. In contrast, our procedure gives significant probabilities to any actions that are just better Ž . rather than best . This has the additional effect of making the behavior continuous, without need for approximations.
Ž . f Eigen¨ector Procedures. The procedure of our Main Theorem differs from Ž all the other procedures leading to correlated equilibria including that of our . Theorem A in an important aspect: It does not require the player to compute, Ž . at every step, an invariant eigen-vector for an appropriate positive matrix.
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Ž . Again, the simplicity of 2.2 is an essential property when discussing nonsophisticated behavior; this is the reason we have sought this result as our Main Theorem.
Ž . g Inertia. A specific and most distinctive feature by which the procedure of our Main Theorem differs from those of Theorem A and the other works mentioned above is that in the former the individual decisions privilege the most recent action taken: The probabilities used at period t q 1 are best thought of as propensities to depart from the play at t.
Viewed in this light, our procedure has significant inertial characteristics. In particular, there is a positive probability of moving from the strategy played at t Ž only if there is another that appears better in which case the probabilities of playing the better strategies are proportional to the regrets relative to the period . 25 t strategy .
Ž . Ž . h Friction. The procedure 2.2 exhibits ''friction'': There is always a positive probability of continuing with the period t strategy. 26 To understand the role 27 Ž . played by friction, suppose that we were to modify the procedure 2.2 by requiring that the switching probabilities be rescaled in such a way that a switch Ž occurs if and only if there is at least one better strategy i.e., one with positive . regret . Then the result of the Main Theorem may not hold. For example, in the familiar two-person 2 = 2 coordination game, if we start with an uncoordinated strategy pair, then the play alternates between the two uncoordinated pairs. However, no distribution concentrated on these two pairs is a correlated equilibrium.
It is worth emphasizing that in our result the breaking away from a bad cycle, like the one just described, is obtained not by ergodic arguments but by the Ž . probability of staying put i.e., by friction . What matters is that the diagonal of 24 For a good test of the simplicity of a procedure, try to explain it verbally; in particular, consider the procedure of our Main Theorem vs. those requiring the computation of eigenvectors. 25 It is worth pointing out that if a player's last choice was j, then the relative probabilities of switching to k or to k X do not depend only on the average utilities that would have been obtained if j had been changed to k or to k X in the past, but also on the average utility that was obtained in Ž X those periods by playing j itself it is the magnitude of the increases in moving from j to k or to k . that matters . the transition matrix be positive, rather than that all the entries be positive Ž . which, indeed, will not hold in our case .
i The set of correlated equilibria. The set of correlated equilibria of a game is, in contrast to the set of Nash equilibria, geometrically simple: It is a convex set Ž . actually, a convex polytope of distributions. Since it includes the Nash equilib-Ž . Ž ria we know it is nonempty. Hart and Schmeidler 1989 see also Nau and Ž .. Ž . McCardle 1990 provide an elementary nonfixed point proof of the nonemptiness of the set of correlated equilibria. This is done by using the Minimax Theorem. Specifically, Hart and Schmeidler proceed by associating to the given N-person game an auxiliary two-person zero-sum game. As it turns out, the correlated equilibria of the original game correspond to the maximin strategies of player I in the auxiliary game. More precisely, in the Hart᎐Schmeidler auxiliary game, player I chooses a distribution over N-tuples of actions, and player II chooses a pair of strategies for one of the N original players Ž . interpreted as a play and a suggested deviation from it . The payoff to auxiliary player II is the expected gain of the designated original player if he were to follow the change suggested by auxiliary player II. In other words, it is the ''regret'' of that original player for not deviating. The starting point for our research was the observation that fictitious play applied to the Hart᎐Schmeidler Ž . auxiliary game must converge, by the result of Robinson 1951 , and thus yield optimal strategies in the auxiliary game, in particular for player Iᎏhence, correlated equilibria in the original game. A direct application of this idea does not, however, produce anything that is simple and separable across the N Ž players i.e., such that the choice of each player at time t is made independently . 28 of the other players' choices at tᎏan indispensable requirement . Yet, our adaptive procedure is based on ''no-regret'' ideas motivated by this analysis and it is the direct descendantᎏseveral modifications laterᎏof this line of research.
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Ž .
j The case of the unknown game. The adaptive procedure of Section 2 can be modified 30 to yield convergence to correlated equilibria also in the case where players neither know the game, nor observe the choices of the other players. 31 Specifically, in choosing play probabilities at time t q 1, a player uses informa-Ž tion only on his own actual past play and payoffs and not on the payoffs that . would have been obtained if his past play had been different . The construction 28 This needed ''decoupling'' across the N original players explains why applying linear programming-type methods to reach the convex polytope of correlated equilibria is not a fruitful approach. Ž Ž . . The resulting procedures operate in the space of N-tuples of strategies S more precisely, in ⌬ S , Ž Ž i .. whereas adaptive procedures should be defined for each player i separately i.e., on ⌬ S . Ž et al. 1995 , Roth and Erev 1995 , Erev and Roth 1998 , Camerer and Ho 1998 , Marimon 1996 Jerusalem, Feldman Bldg., Gi¨at-Ram, 91904 Jerusalem, Israel; hart@math.huji.ac.il; http:rrwww.ma.huji.ac.ilr ; hart and Dept. de Economia i Empresa, and CREI, Uni¨ersitat Pompeu Fabra, Ramon Trias Fargas 25᎐27, 08005 Barcelona, Spain; mcolell@upf.es; http:rrwww.econ. upf.esrcreirmcolell.htm Manuscript recei¨ed No¨ember, 1997; final re¨ision recei¨ed July, 1999 .
APPENDIX : PROOF OF THE MAIN THEOREM
This appendix is devoted to the proof of the Main Theorem, stated in Section 2. The proof is Ž . inspired by the result of Section 3 Theorem A . It is however more complex on account of our transition probabilities not being the invariant measures that, as we saw in Section 3, fitted so well with Blackwell's Approachability Theorem.
As in the standard proof of Blackwell's Approachability Theorem, the proof of our Main Theorem is based on a recursive formula for the distance of the vector of regrets to the negative Ž . orthant. However, our procedure 2.2 does not satisfy the Blackwell condition; it is rather a sort of Ž . iterative approximation to it. Thus, a simple one-period recursion from t to t q 1 does not suffice, and we have to consider instead a multi-period recursion where a large ''block'' of periods, from t to t q¨, is combined together. Both t and¨are carefully chosen; in particular, t and¨go to infinity, but¨is relatively small compared to t.
We start by introducing some notation. Fix player i in N. For simplicity, we drop reference to the Ž i i index i whenever this cannot cause confusion thus we write D and R instead of D and R , and t t t t . < i < so on . Let m [ S be the number of strategies of player i, and let M be an upper bound on i's 
We shall write A for the vector A j, k g ‫ޒ‬ ; the same goes for D , D , R , and so on. Let
We write 1 for the indicator of the event G. G Ž . Ž ⌸ и, и denote the transition probabilities from t to t q 1 these are computed after period t, based
Thus, at time t q 1 the strategy used by player i is to choose each k g S i with probability i Ž . Ž . It will be convenient to use the standard ''O'' notation: For two real-valued functions f и and Ž .
Ž . Ž Ž .. g и defined on a domain X, ''f x s O g x '' means that there exists a constant K-ϱ such that < Ž .< Ž .
34 f x F Kg x for all x in X. We write P for Probability, and E for Expectation. From now on, t, Ž .
ï
, and w will denote positive integers; h s s will be histories of length t; j, k, and s will be The domain X will usually be the set of positive integers, or the set of vectors whose Ž . Ž . < Ž .< coordinates are positive integers. Thus when we write, say, f t,¨s O¨, it means f t,¨F K¨for Ž . all¨and t. The constants K will always depend only on the game through N, m, M, and so on and on the parameter .
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i X X Ž i . We write ⌸ for the transition probability matrix of player i thus ⌸ is ⌸ . Ž Ž.. We now provide an intuitive guide to the proof. The first step M1 i is our basic recursion Ž equation. In Blackwell's Theorem, the middle term on the right-hand side vanishes it is F 0 by Ž .. 3.2 . This is not so in our case; Steps M2᎐M8 are thus devoted to estimating this term.
Step M2 Ž . yields an expression similar to 3.4 , but here the coefficients ␣ depend also on the moves of the i yi Ž other players. Indeed, given h , the choices s and s are not independent when w ) 1 since . relative to t, the change in probabilities is small see Steps M3 and M4 , and we estimate the total Ž . Ž . Ž difference Step M5 . Next Step M6 , we factor out the moves of the other players which, in the . s-process, are independent of the moves of player i from the coefficients ␣. At this point we get thêˆ Ž difference between the transition probabilities after w periods and after w q 1 periods for Ž . comparison, in formula 3.4 we would replace both by the invariant distribution, so the difference . 
